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Equality
PETER B. RUTLEDGE*

Under the principle of sovereign equality of nations, nation states are entitled
to equal dignity (evidenced by conventions like their voting rights in the United
Nations), have the identical capacity to contract (evidenced by their ability to
enter into treaties), and are not subject to a superior sovereign (evidenced by the
lack of a global leviathan). This principle also has had an important effect in
the field of international civil litigation, in areas such as judicial jurisdiction or
sovereign immunity. As that principle has weakened over the twentieth century,
risks of aggravation to comity have risen, resulting in the development of other
doctrines to re-enforce comity values. Yet ironically, to the extent these comity reenforcing doctrines invite (or require) courts of one state to sit in judgment of
another state’s court or legal system they have the potential to undermine the
very values they seek to promote. This Article offers a fresh approach to
harnessing the advantages of those doctrines while avoiding the pitfalls they can
entail for comity and the sovereign equality principle.
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“This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common
interest impeling them to mutual intercourse, and interchange of good offices with
each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is
understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial
jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation . . . One of
these is admitted to be the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest
or detention within a foreign territory.”1

INTRODUCTION
The springboard for this session of the symposium, the Lago Agrio
litigation, presents a perfect storm for scholars of international civil
litigation.2 On the one hand, the case contains allegations of plaintiffs’
counsel corrupting a country’s judicial system — arguably its entire legal
apparatus — to procure a multibillion dollar judgment to be used by
plaintiffs to lock up Chevron’s assets around the world.3 On the other
hand, the case contains efforts by Texaco to export the lawsuit from
United States shores, followed by Chevron’s effort to return to a United
States court in an attempt to block enforcement of the Lago Agrio
judgment.4
Seen through this lens, the case raises important questions concerning
the extent to which one sovereign’s courts can — and should — question
another sovereign’s actions or, more generally, the system producing those
actions. The Lago Agrio litigation triggered these concerns in various ways.
First, at the earliest stage of the litigation, the case called upon a U.S. court
1. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
2. The litigation has generated numerous reported decisions and commentary. See, e.g., Chevron
Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998);
Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994); see also Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v.
ChevronTexaco: Discretionary Grounds for the Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments for Environmental Injury in
the United States, 28 VA. ENVTL L.J. 241 (2010); Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco: Mandatory
Grounds for the Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United States, 19 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (2009); Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue
Locally: Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456 (2011);
Chris Jochnick & Nina Rabaeus, Business and Human Rights Revitalized: A New UN Framework Meets
Texaco in the Amazon, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 413 (2010); Judith Kimerling, Indigenous
Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The Case of Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 413 (2006).
3. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Chevron
Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012).
4. See id.
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to evaluate the “adequacy” of the Ecuadoran legal system in the context of
Texaco’s motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens.5 In this
instance, the court was being asked to predict how Ecuador’s judiciary
would treat the Lago Agrio plaintiffs’ claims if they were brought in
Ecuador. Second, after the Lago Agrio judgment was rendered, Chevron
sought a declaration from a U.S. court that the judgment was
unenforceable based on alleged corruption in Ecuador’s judicial system.6
Here, the court was being asked to make a backward-looking judgment
about how the Ecuadoran system in fact treated the plaintiffs’ claims, and
the compatibility of that system with the court’s (specifically, the Southern
District of New York’s) judgment enforcement standards. Lastly, Chevron
sought (and temporarily obtained) an antisuit injunction barring
enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment.7 Here, it was asking the court to
balance Ecuador’s interests in seeing one of its judgments satisfied against
the United States’ interests in ensuring that an American-based company
was not wrongly deprived of its property as a result of an allegedly
fraudulently obtained judgment.
These three examples share certain common features but also differ in
important respects. At some level, they all entail some series of factual
findings about the Ecuadoran legal system, and require the court to lay
those findings against a normative-laden standard (adequacy in the case of
forum non conveniens, integrity of the judicial system in the case of judgment
enforcement, and the interest balance in the case of the antisuit
injunction). Beyond these surface similarities, however, the three inquiries
differ in potentially salient respects. As already noted, the forum non
conveniens inquiry entails a forward-looking prediction about how the
Ecuadoran legal system would treat a set of claims; by contrast, the
judgment enforcement and antisuit injunction inquiries entail a backwardlooking assessment about what, in fact, happened in Ecuador.
Furthermore, the forum non conveniens inquiry occurs at a time when the
Ecuadoran legal system has not invested substantial resources into
adjudication of the case; by contrast, the judgment enforcement inquiry
occurs after those resources have been invested; the antisuit injunction
(when sought) occurs at a time when other third-country enforcement
forums have not dedicated any resources to the enforcement of the Lago
Agrio judgment.
While the Lago Agrio litigation presents perhaps an especially colorful
example, it is hardly the first time such questions have arisen. Indeed, a
comprehensive survey of the field of international civil litigation reveals
5. See Jota, 157 F.3d 153; Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. 61.
6. See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581.
7. See id.
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that these questions, examined at a sufficiently high level of generality,
arise with surprising regularity.8 To identify just a few examples:
 These issues can arise at the front-end of a dispute when a U.S.
court, confronted with a forum non conveniens motion, must decide
whether the proposed foreign forum is “adequate.”9
 These issues can arise in the middle of a dispute when a U.S.
court must decide whether to order discovery in the face of a
foreign blocking statute.10
 Finally, these issues can arise at the end of a dispute when a court
must rule on a petition to enforce a foreign judgment in the face
of claims that the foreign judgment is the product of a corrupt
legal system.11
These examples represent just a few of the myriad doctrines requiring a
federal court to pass judgment on the acts (or systems) of a foreign
sovereign.
Despite the frequency with which these issues arise, they remain
remarkably undertheorized. While much scholarship may have focused on
particular doctrines or nibbled at the edges of this topic,12 there has been
far too little effort toward the construction of unified theories, whether
positive or normative. This symposium represents a laudable step toward
constructing such theories, regarding both what courts do and what they
ought to do.
This Article seeks to help fill that void. Historically, doctrines such as
the absolute theory of sovereign immunity and strict territorialist notions
of jurisdiction (what I term “formalist” doctrines) effectively restrained
domestic courts from regularly sitting in judgment of the acts or systems
of a foreign sovereign. As those doctrines broke down and were replaced
by doctrines like the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity or “effects”
based standards for prescriptive or judicial jurisdictions, opportunities for
jurisdictional conflict — and clash — emerged. As these doctrines raised
8. See generally GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS (5th ed. 2011).
9. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253–54 (1981).
10. See, e.g., In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
11. See, e.g., Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 201 F.3d 134
(2d Cir. 2000).
12. See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the
Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147 (2006); Elizabeth T. Lear, National Interests, Foreign
Injuries, and Federal Forum Non Conveniens, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559 (2007); Joel H. Samuels, When is
an Alternative Forum Available? Rethinking the Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 85 IND. L.J. 1059 (2010);
Steven R. Swanson, Antisuit Injunctions in Support of International Arbitration, 81 TUL. L. REV. 395 (2006);
Christopher A. Whytock, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 1444 (2011).
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the risks of intersovereign conflict, others, such as forum non conveniens,
exhaustion, and comity, sought to temper these clashes.
While well-intended, this latter group of doctrines contained its own
challenge to the sovereign equality principle. It invited domestic courts to
sit in judgment of the acts or systems of a foreign sovereign. This could
occur when, for example, a U.S. court must consider whether a foreign
sovereign’s interests counsel against the exercise of judicial jurisdiction or
whether a foreign sovereign’s judicial system is so corrupt as to warrant
denying enforcement to a judgment rendered within it.
Consequently, the need for an alternative approach arises. I defend here
a functional approach. By functional approach, I mean one that focuses on
the judicial capacity of domestic courts to undertake these sorts of
inquiries about their foreign counterparts and their legal systems; such
undertakings can entail significant risks for the sovereign equality principle.
Unpacking in functional terms what precisely motivates concerns about
domestic courts sitting in judgment of a foreign sovereign’s acts or
decisions — and considering the extent to which one can mitigate those
concerns — helps reconcile the sovereign equality principle with the
jurisdictional competition that has marked the modern era of international
civil litigation.
This Article develops those themes in three parts. Part I articulates a
definition of sovereign equality, sketches out the doctrines in which issues
of sovereign equality arise, and categorizes those doctrines. Part II
develops a functional theory in which to examine these issues. Part III
examines the implications of the functional theory for the doctrinal
puzzles.

I.

SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND DOCTRINE

The concept at issue in this panel of the symposium, “the sovereign
equality of nations,” has received extensive treatment in the academic
literature.13 Famously embraced in the UN Charter,14 the principle
emerged from the post-Westphalian consensus that gave primacy to

13. See, e.g., Charles W. Powers, Ethics and United States Trade Policy, in 5 COMM’N ON CRITICAL
CHOICES FOR AMS., CRITICAL CHOICES FOR AMERICANS: TRADE, INFLATION & ETHICS 253, 261
(1976); Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental Protection Policy, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
751 (1993); John H. Jackson, The Changing Fundamentals of International Law and Ten Years of the WTO, 8
J. INT’L ECON. L. 3 (2005); Brad R. Roth, Coming to Terms with Ruthlessness: Sovereign Equality, Global
Pluralism, and the Limits of International Criminal Justice, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 231 (2010); Carlos
M. Vásquez, Withdrawing from International Custom: Terrible Food, Small Portions, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE
269 (2011). For a good, if slightly dated, collection of literature, see John H. Jackson, SovereigntyModern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 784 nn.8–9 (2003).
14. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1.
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nation-states and, in the words of the International Court of Justice, serves
as “one of the fundamental principles of the national legal order.”15
As John Jackson has explained, the sovereign equality principle “has
many dimensions.”16 One dimension of this principle focuses on
sovereignty. The concept entails the complete and unfettered exercise of
jurisdiction of a sovereign within its boundaries. A corollary is one of
noninterference: one sovereign cannot assert jurisdiction (whether
legislative or judicial) within another sovereign’s territory. Finally, the
concept lays the intellectual foundation for the principle of immunity —
that one sovereign (or its diplomatic representatives or property) remains
immune from suit in another sovereign’s courts. In the words of Chief
Justice Marshall from Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,17 one sovereign was
implicitly waiving a small part of its absolute authority over conduct within
its territory.18
The other dimension centers on “equality.” Sovereigns became the
relevant agents at the level of international law; for instance, they can
consent to matters (in the case of treaties). Their conduct supplies the
basis for the identification of custom in international law. No entity enjoys
an authority superior to sovereign nation-states.
For several centuries following the principle’s emergence, formalist
doctrines adequately sustained it. Strict territorialist doctrines governed the
exercise of both judicial jurisdiction and prescriptive jurisdiction by
states.19 Conflict of law rules precluded private parties from avoiding
judicial or prescriptive jurisdiction by means of choice-of-law or forum
selection clauses.20 Absolute theories of sovereign immunity precluded
nations from exercising jurisdiction over other nations.21 Even when the
nations themselves were not parties to a suit, one sovereign’s courts
refused to sit in judgment of the validity of acts taken in another
sovereign’s territory.22
In the late nineteenth and especially the twentieth century, these
formalist doctrines described in the preceding paragraph began to erode,
weakening the sovereign equality principle. Territorialist notions of judicial
15. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, ¶ 57 (Feb.
3, 2012), available at http://tinyurl.com/85wafeo.
16. Jackson, supra note 13, at 782.
17. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
18. Id. at 136.
19. See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S
714 (1877).
20. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (discussing the historical judicial
hostility to forum selection agreements); 2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 1080 (1935) (discussing unenforceability of choice-of-law clauses).
21. See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at
137.
22. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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and prescriptive jurisdiction were replaced with rules permitting the
extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction over conduct that had an “effect”
on the regulating sovereign.23 Choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses
were increasingly enforced.24 A restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,
encapsulated most famously in the Tate Letter,25 replaced more absolutist
notions.26 Limits emerged to the act-of-state doctrine, and the foreignsovereign-compulsion doctrine faded into obscurity.27 The net effect of
these changes would be to increase jurisdictional competition among
sovereigns over the regulation of the same conduct and, consequently, the
opportunities for clashes between countries. Despite the re-emergence of
some territorialist doctrines in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries,28 the net effect has been a weakening of the formalist notions
that once buttressed the sovereign equality principle.
While these doctrinal developments weakened the principle of
sovereign equality, other doctrines helped to strengthen it. For example, in
the judicial jurisdiction context, the “reasonableness” prong contemplated
consideration of the foreign sovereign’s interests.29 “Comity” doctrines
constrained the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, especially in antitrust
cases.30 Forum non conveniens and exhaustion doctrines reduce jurisdictional
conflict by channeling some cases to foreign courts even where jurisdiction
of the U.S. court is authorized.31 Finally, while sovereign immunity may be
riddled with exceptions, the law still presumes the sovereign’s immunity
from suit.32
While seeking to reduce the risks of jurisdictional competition, each of
these limits also had the effect of forcing courts to wade more deeply into
the acts or systems of a foreign sovereign and, thus, risk offending the
23. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui &
Co., 671 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
24. See Bremen, 407 U.S. 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971).
25. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State, to Philip B. Perlman,
Acting U.S. Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), in 26 Dept. State Bull. 984–985 (1952).
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S 400 (1990). See generally
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 8, at ch. 9.
28. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (plurality opinion); Morrison v.
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
29. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
30. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), superseded by statute,
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246 (1982)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006)), as recognized in McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802 (9th
Cir. 1988).
31. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253–54 (1981); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 550
F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
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sovereign equality principle. For example, the “reasonableness” prong of
the personal jurisdiction inquiry forced courts to weigh the interests of a
foreign sovereign state and, thereby, entailed the risk that some sovereign’s
interests would be insufficiently weighty.33 The forum non conveniens doctrine
required U.S. courts to decide whether a foreign judicial system was
“adequate” (setting up the possibility that one sovereign’s courts might be
more adequate than another’s). The exhaustion doctrine, designed in an
effort to channel some disputes to a foreign court, forced U.S. courts also
to consider whether resort to some foreign forums might be futile.34
Foreign judgment enforcement doctrines, though founded on principles of
comity, forced courts to consider whether the judgment was the product
of a corrupt system.35 Ironically then, in an effort to shore up the
sovereign equality principle, these various doctrinal developments
threatened to undermine it.
Efforts to moderate erosion of the sovereign equality principle have not
developed in a systematic or coherent manner. Instead, they largely have
emerged through judicial adaptations on the margins of the doctrine.36
This incremental form of development ensures that courts must consider,
constantly anew, how to preserve the core of the equality principle in a
world of constantly conflicting assertions of jurisdiction. Consequently, it
becomes critical to think systematically about these doctrinal categories
and theorize how to reconcile them with the sovereign equality principle.
All doctrines implicating the sovereign equality of nations can, with the
exception of some debatable grey areas, be divided into three main
categories: (1) sovereign as party; (2) sovereign as adjudicator; and (3)
sovereign as regulator. Categorization along these lines permits more
theoretically rich consideration of the effects of these doctrines upon the
sovereign equality principle.
I will begin with the easiest case — the sovereign as party. This was the
type of situation envisioned by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Schooner Exchange.37 Such issues obviously come up in cases against foreign
sovereigns under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).38 They
33. See, e.g., Afram Exp. Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir.1985).
34. See, e.g., Abiola v. Abubakar, 435 F. Supp. 2d 830 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
35. See, e.g., Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 201 F.3d 134
(2d Cir. 2000).
36. To be sure, there are exceptions where Congress has spoken directly, such as the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)),the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, Pub.
L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (1964) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)
(2006)), and the Helms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified as amended
at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1643l, 1643m, 6021–6024, 6031–6046, 6061–6067, 6081–6085, 6091 (2006 & Supp. V
2011)). I return to these examples infra Part III.
37. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
38. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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also appear in cases where an individual is being sued in his or her capacity
as a representative of a foreign sovereign, such as cases involving claims of
diplomatic immunity, head-of-state immunity, and official immunity.39
Each of these cases potentially implicates the sovereign equality principle.
To the extent immunity does not warrant dismissal of the suit, one
sovereign’s courts are sitting in judgment of the conduct of another
sovereign (or that sovereign’s agent). Maintenance of the suit imposes
costs on the sovereign — whether in the form of litigation costs or in the
form of a judgment that might be enforced in jurisdictions where the
sovereign has assets. Maintenance of the suit also can ruffle the foreign
relations of the United States, evidenced for example by the diplomatic
protests that have been filed by sovereign governments sued as
defendants.40
The second set of doctrines involves the state as adjudicator. The Lago
Agrio litigation raises several such doctrines — forum non conveniens,
judgment enforcement, and antisuit injunctions. Other doctrines falling
into this category include the enforcement of arbitral awards (particularly
the question whether to enforce awards set aside in the arbitral forum),41
exhaustion,42 and the decision whether to issue a stay lis alibi pendens.43 Like
the cases involving the state as a party, they too can undermine the foreign
relations of the United States or the activities of the political branches.
Unlike cases involving the state as a party, they do not necessarily entail
the same litigation or judgment compliance costs. Nonetheless, these suits
may entail some costs, depending on the degree to which the foreign
judicial system already has invested in the suit. For example, cases
involving doctrines such as forum non conveniens dismissals, exhaustion
requirements (coupled with futility exceptions), and possibly personal
jurisdiction dismissals, may involve relatively low costs because the foreign
sovereign judicial system generally has not invested in the suit. By contrast,
costs may be much higher in cases involving doctrines like judgment
enforcement due to the investment of resources by the foreign
sovereign.44
Finally, some doctrines involve cases of the state as regulator. Unlike
the preceding set of doctrines, these cases do not necessarily involve a U.S.
court passing judgment on the act of a foreign judiciary (or a foreign
judicial system’s capacity to undertake that act). Nonetheless, they entail
39. See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). See generally BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra
note 7, at ch. 3.
40. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 8, at ch. 3.
41. See In re Chromalloy Aeroservices, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).
42. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
43. See, e.g., Continental Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
44. Doctrines involving parallel proceedings, like antisuit injunctions and stays lis alibi pendens, fall
between these two poles.
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review of other acts, often legislative ones. For example, the act-of-state
doctrine precludes U.S. courts from sitting in judgment of the validity of
foreign acts of state taking place on the foreign sovereign’s territory.45
Similarly, the foreign-sovereign-compulsion doctrine precludes a U.S.
court from requiring conduct that would be illegal in another state.46
Other doctrines do not have quite the same categorical bite, but
nonetheless require consideration of a foreign sovereign’s legislative acts.
Resolving discovery conflicts in the face of blocking statutes and public
policy exceptions to the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses all require
courts to balance the competing interests of the court’s own sovereign and
those of the foreign sovereign lawmaking body.47 Finally, territoriality rules
governing prescriptive jurisdiction can indirectly affect a foreign state as
regulator to the extent the U.S. rule regulates overseas conduct in a
manner different than the state in whose territory the conduct is
occurring.48
The following table summarizes the basic framework set forth in this
Part:
TABLE 1
Function of State

Example of Doctrines Implicating
the Sovereign Equality Principle

State as Party

Sovereign immunity and exceptions

State as Regulator

Extraterritoriality; Act of State
Doctrine;
Foreign
Sovereign
Compulsion Doctrine; Choice-ofLaw Rules; Discovery Disputes

State as Adjudicator

Judicial Jurisdiction; Forum Non
Conveniens; Lis Alibi Pendens; Antisuit
Injunctions; Judgment Enforcement
Rules

45. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
46. See, e.g., In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 279 F.R.D. 90 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Animal Sci. Prod.,
Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D.N.J. 2010), vacated,
654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Tex. Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D.
Del. 1970).
47. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 7, at chs. 5, 11.
48. See id. at ch. 8.
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This Part has illustrated the myriad situations in which doctrines
involving the sovereign equality of nations may arise. It also has articulated
a potential framework in which to categorize those doctrines. The next
Part offers a functional approach to evaluating how courts treat the
sovereign equality principle in these various doctrinal categories.

II.

TOWARD A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

The preceding Part offered a working definition of the sovereign
equality of nations, identified the various doctrines potentially implicating
that principle, and suggested a potentially useful classification of those
doctrines. This Part articulates an approach for thinking about the
principle of sovereign equality in functional terms.
To be clear, by functional approach, I mean one that rejects “formalist”
notions of what courts can (or should) and cannot (or should not) do.
Instead, a functional approach examines the fitness of courts to play the
particular roles that they are sometimes asked to undertake in international
disputes.
Of course, at a sufficiently broad level, one can argue that the
overarching concern here is one of judicial intervention in the foreign
affairs of the United States. Anytime a court ventures into a case involving
a foreign sovereign or conduct abroad, those risks arise. For the analysis to
be more meaningful, it becomes necessary to unpack this generalized
foreign affairs concern and examine the precise ways in which judicial
doctrines might tread upon the sovereign equality principle. Here, I
identify three specific concerns: (1) institutional; (2) constitutional; and (3)
retaliation. In the following Subsections, I explore the constraint and the
extent to which mechanisms exist to mitigate the risks.

A.

Institutional Constraints

One set of concerns relates to the capacity of federal judges to conduct
the inquiry required by these doctrines. Jurists have not come to an
agreement concerning their own capacities in this regard.49
49. One classic formulation comes from Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in the Reinsurance case:
If I thought we had to do such balancing, I would be at sea. If I knew how to balance
incommensurables, I would be hard pressed to agree with courts saying (as the district judge
did) that a suit by the government is “more important” than private litigation. In a capitalist
economy enforcement of contracts is a subject of the first magnitude. The gravity of the
nation’s interest is no less when it decides to enforce vital rules through private initiative. A
court would need to know the “importance” of the substantive rule, which is not well
correlated with the enforcement mechanism. (The antitrust laws are “more important” than
the littering laws, although the former are largely enforced by private suits and the latter by
public prosecutions.)
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Some institutional constraints concern the court’s ability to make valueladen judgments about seemingly incommensurable values. For example,
some discovery disputes or the Gilbert factors of the forum non conveniens
determinations expressly require judges to engage in a normative inquiry
balancing the competing interests of sovereigns with a stake in the case.50
Here, the capacity concern stems from a belief that judges lack the
necessary skill and training to ascertain the “strength” of a particular
sovereign’s interest.
Other institutional constraints instead focus upon the court’s lack of
access to the relevant information necessary to make an accurate decision,
and therefore raises concerns about error costs. Doctrines such as the
“adequacy” determination in the forum non conveniens doctrine or the “bias”
exception to the enforcement of foreign judgments involve different
capacity concerns. Can a U.S. court ever accurately assess the
Ecuadoran — or any foreign — legal system? Differences in the primary
language of the two countries, or limited access to the relevant legal
sources may make these concerns particularly acute. Here, the concern
goes primarily to error rates rather than some institutional constraint on
the court to make a normative determination.
While these institutional concerns are significant, various mechanisms
might dampen their effects. For example, as to the former capacity
constraint (involving interest balancing), a court can solicit the views of the
U.S. Government and, where appropriate, the foreign government. The
U.S. Government routinely files such statements in matters of
international civil litigation.51 By contrast, statements by foreign
Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1284 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
A slightly different perspective comes from Judge Kozinski’s opinion for the Ninth Circuit in
Patrickson:
Nor do we understand how a court can go about evaluating the foreign policy implications of
another government's expression of interest. Assuming that foreign relations are an
appropriate consideration at all, the relevant question is not whether the foreign government
is pleased or displeased by the litigation, but how the case affects the interests of the United
States. That is an inherently political judgment, one that courts – whether state or federal –
are not competent to make. If courts were to take the interests of the foreign government
into account, they would be conducting foreign policy by deciding whether it serves our
national interests to continue with the litigation, dismiss it on some ground such as forum
non conveniens, or deal with it in some other way. Because such political judgments are not
within the competence of either state or federal courts, we can see no support for the
proposition that federal courts are better equipped than state courts to deal with cases raising
such concerns.
Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 803–04 (9th Cir., 2001) (citations omitted).
50. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
51. See, e.g, Statement of Interest of the U.S., Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (Nos.
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governments are less routine, but there certainly are examples of foreign
governments addressing how a particular legal question affects their
interest; the Lago Agrio litigation is a prime example.52 As to the latter
capacity constraint (involving access to relevant information and error
rates), a court can (and often does) rely on experts — whether offered by
the parties or designated by the court itself — to educate the court about
the contours of a legal system. Those expert opinions hold forth the
potential of reducing error rates in the court’s assessment of a foreign legal
system.
Of course, these mechanisms do not completely overcome the
institutional constraints. As to the former, assessing the interests of the
United States may not always be easy, particularly given the ongoing
debates about the shared responsibility of the Executive Branch and
Congress for the maintenance of foreign affairs. Moreover, changes in
Administration may lead to changes in litigating positions, as recent
experience under the Alien Tort Statute53 or the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act exemplifies.54 On the foreign government front, disputes
may arise over who “speaks” for the foreign government, as exemplified
by the South Africa litigation.55 As to the latter institutional constraint
regarding error costs, reliance on experts merely transfers the error risks to
the expert opinion, and sometimes courts must resolve disputes between
the parties’ experts over matters of methodology and form.
Ultimately, my goal here is not to resolve as a categorical matter
whether institutional constraints are severe or capable of mitigation.
Rather, my aim here is to unpack precisely what we mean when we express
doubts about the capacity of courts in conducting the inquiries and, more
importantly, to identify possible modes by which those capacity concerns
can be addressed. In Part III we can examine at a more granular level the
extent to which particular doctrines lend themselves to these types of
devices, which may shape our view about when a particular doctrine
threatens the sovereign equality principle.

94-9035, 94-9069); Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae, Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir.
1989) (Nos. 86-2448, 86-15039); Memorandum for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090); Supplemental Statement of Interest of the U.S., Doe v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. CIV.A.01-1357(LFO)).
52. See Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp.
61 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
54. See Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar and Executive Power, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885 (2011).
55. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 276–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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Constitutional Constraints

Even assuming courts have the capacity to weigh the effect of an action
on the sovereign equality principle, separate constitutional concerns may
arise on the ground that the very undertaking is inconsistent with
separation-of-powers principles. Under this critique, when courts utilize
and develop doctrines that tread upon the acts of a foreign sovereign, they
intrude upon the prerogatives of the political branches. These branches, so
the argument goes, retain control over the foreign affairs power of the
United States. Thus, absent express authorization from the political
branches, courts should stay their hand. Judicially crafted doctrines such as
antisuit injunctions would be inconsistent with this conception of the
foreign affairs power, as would aggressive assertions of prescriptive or
judicial jurisdiction absent express legislative authorization. A particularly
hot-button example in international civil litigation right now is the federal
courts’ exercise of their residual federal common law lawmaking power
under the Alien Tort Statute to impose civil liability for certain violations
of the law of nations.56
Here too, mechanisms might exist to soften the blow to separation-ofpowers principles. Most obviously, courts might solicit — and defer to —
the views of the Executive Branch in weighing the effect of an assertion of
jurisdiction or exercise of federal common law lawmaking power. Courts
have articulated various doctrines directly tied to the Executive Branch’s
views, such as the policy of case-specific deference to the Executive
Branch on the foreign relations implications of entertaining jurisdiction in
a particular suit,57 the Bernstein exception to the act-of-state doctrine,58 and
judicial acceptance of the Executive Branch’s view on questions of foreign
official immunity.59
As with the mechanisms examined in the preceding Subpart, these
mechanisms are helpful, but hardly foolproof. One should not overlook
the cost to the Executive Branch of having to offer its view on a case.
Sometimes, the political calculus is weighty on both sides, and turning the
case on the views of the Executive Branch may force the government to
take a position when it prefers not to do so.60

56. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
57. See id., at 733 n.21; Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701–02 & nn.21–22 (2004).
58. See, e.g., Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d
375 (2d Cir. 1954).
59. See ; Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar, Official Immunity and Federal Common Law, 15 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 589 (2011); Rutledge, supra note 54.
60. Such concerns animated the State Department’s desire to surrender control over foreign
sovereign immunity determinations and, instead, have the matter managed under the FSIA’s
framework.

2012]

C.

A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN EQUALITY

195

Retaliation

Finally, related to the two foregoing concerns, but warranting distinct
treatment, judicial activity in the field of international civil litigation may
trigger concerns about retaliation. For example, countries have enacted
retaliatory jurisdiction laws permitting the exercise of judicial jurisdiction
over a foreign company to the extent the courts of the country where that
company is located would exercise jurisdiction.61 Other countries have
enacted blocking statutes in response to assertions of discovery power by
U.S. courts.62 Along the same lines, foreign countries have enacted
clawback statutes in response to extraterritorial assertions of prescriptive
jurisdiction.63 These examples certainly illustrate that actual retaliation is
possible. The actual incidence of retaliation remains rare, suggesting that
the doctrine is being driven more by fears that retaliation could occur if
courts do not stay their hand in certain cases.
Various doctrines mitigate the risk, including the presumption against
extraterritoriality64 and the presumption not to construe statutes so as to
interfere with the legitimate interest of foreign sovereign states.65 Courts
also have adopted rules taking the prospect of foreign sovereign retaliation
into account, such as when they craft a sanction for noncompliance with a
discovery order due to a foreign blocking statute.66
Here too, the mitigating factors are helpful but hardly complete. Canons
such as those against extraterritoriality or against interference with foreign
sovereign interests are easier to articulate than to apply. They beg the
question how a court is to decide whether Congress has overcome the
presumption or whether the interference with a foreign sovereign interest
is sufficiently weighty. The devil here, as usual, is in the details.
This Part has articulated a functional framework for evaluating how
legal doctrines manage the sovereign equality principle. The focus has been
on various concerns that could arise when federal courts apply a particular
doctrine, specifically issues of capacity, retaliation, and separation of
powers. To varying degrees, escape hatches are available to courts to
temper those effects on the sovereign equality principle. The final Part
applies this approach to the three categories of cases — sovereign as party,

61. See Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 1, 15 (1987).
62. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 8, at 972.
63. See id., at 682.
64. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); Love v. Associated
Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2010); Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631
F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010).
65. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 442 (1987).

196

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 53:181

sovereign as adjudicator, and sovereign as legislator — that might
implicate the principle.

III. THE FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED
This Part combines the typology developed in Part I with the functional
considerations developed in Part II. My central thesis is that the functional
concerns raised in Part II are at their nadir in cases involving the state as a
party, are of moderate significance in cases involving the state as regulator,
and are at their zenith in cases involving state as adjudicator. The upshot
of the thesis is two-fold: (1) that courts should be most sensitive to the
sovereign equality principle in cases involving foreign states as adjudicators
and (2) policymakers should examine additional means by which U.S.
courts can mitigate those risks to the sovereign equality principle in these
cases.

A.

State as Party

With respect to cases where the foreign state is a party, courts suffer
from relatively few capacity constraints. Enactment of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act has overcome both forms of capacity
constraints. As to first-order capacity constraints, the FSIA has rendered
the immunity determination a largely statutory inquiry, something that
courts are fully equipped to undertake. As to second-order capacity
constraints, both the definitions of the entities in § 160367 and the
definition of the exceptions in § 1605,68 do not entail the sort of valueladen determinations that troubled some judges.69 Thus, insofar as we are
concerned about judicial capacity, and whether we are dealing with firstorder or second-order concerns, cases involving foreign states as parties
present relatively little threat to the sovereign equality principle.
Likewise, cases involving states as parties generally do not entail
significant concerns about separation of powers. The grant of jurisdiction
set forth in the FSIA indicates congressional comfort with the immunity
determination. For similar reasons, to the extent the assertion of
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign risks retaliation by the sovereign,
Congress presumably considered this risk in weighing whether to authorize
the particular grant of jurisdiction. Even where such a risk was unforeseen
or is especially weighty, the Court has left open an escape hatch through
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2006).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
69. See supra note 49. Put another way, judges applying the FSIA merely are making
determinations about a party’s institutional affiliations and conduct rather than weighing competing
interests of sovereign states.
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case-by-case deference to the views of the Executive Branch on the
diplomatic implications of entertaining a particular suit.70
Yet the FSIA also demonstrates that there are various degrees to which
the political branches might retain a residual role. § 1605A71 supplies an
important counterpoint. Among other things, this section stipulates that a
state can be sued under the terrorism and torture exception only if the
Secretary of State has determined that the state is a “state sponsor of
terrorism.”72 Conceptually, the FSIA might extend this same model to all
the immunity determinations, assuring the Executive Branch a greater role
in controlling the extent to which a sister sovereign state is sued.

B.

State as Legislator

With respect to capacity constraints, error costs can be mitigated
through effective use of party-appointed or court-appointed experts to
educate the court about the foreign sovereign’s law or legal system. For
example, in the foreign sovereign compulsion context, such experts can
educate the U.S. court on whether a foreign legal system prohibits a
particular course of conduct. Likewise, in the discovery context, experts
can educate a court on the penalties that might attach if a foreign party
complies with a U.S. court’s discovery order.
Where courts must evaluate the legislative acts of a foreign sovereign,
here too they have tools to reduce the impact on foreign affairs and to
mitigate the risk of retaliation. The presumption against extraterritoriality
supplies a good example. Under that presumption, federal courts will
presume that Congress has not intended to give a law extraterritorial effect
unless it has spoken clearly. The presumption reduces the risk that courts
will mistakenly entertain cases predicated on extraterritorial conduct,
particularly in situations (such as antitrust) where the foreign sovereign
may tolerate or even approve of the conduct.73 Since the presumption only
operates at the level of statutory interpretation however, the doctrine
preserves for the political branches the ability to regulate extraterritorial
conduct where they see fit (and under particular terms).
Seen against this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.74 can be understood as an effort to
re-enforce the separation-of-powers concerns underpinning the sovereign
70. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701–02 (2004).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (Supp. V 2011).
72. See id.
73. In this regard, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290,
96 Stat. 1246 (1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006)) offers an exceptional attempt by the political
branches to hem in the assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct having an
effect in the United States. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004).
74. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
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equality principle. The Court held that the federal securities laws lacked the
plain statement of congressional intent to apply to allegedly fraudulent
transactions involving foreign plaintiffs taking place on foreign
exchanges.75 In the wake of the Court’s decision, however, Congress
amended the securities laws to restore extraterritorial application but only
as to suits brought by the Justice Department or the Securities and
Exchange Commission.76 This partial overruling of Morrison can be
understood as a vindication of the Court’s decision, because Congress was
forced to determine the extent to which it wished — and did not wish —
to allow private plaintiffs (as opposed to government officials) to use U.S.
securities laws to regulate conduct taking place on foreign soil.
Similar efforts to address separation-of-powers concerns in sovereign
qua regulator cases can be found in the act-of-state doctrine. That federal
common law doctrine, as noted above, precludes courts from sitting in
judgment of the validity of the acts of a foreign sovereign taken on its own
soil.77 An underlying purpose for the doctrine is to reduce friction in the
foreign relations of the United States. Based on this animating principle,
some courts (though never a clear majority of the Supreme Court) have
recognized an exception to the doctrine where the Executive Branch
indicates that it has no objections to maintenance of the suit.78 The
Bernstein exception (so named for a pair of post-World War II cases that
presented the issue) serves a purpose quite similar to the presumption
against extraterritoriality. To buttress the sovereign equality principle, the
Court articulated a doctrine rooted in separation-of-powers concerns but
left space for the political branches to eliminate those concerns through a
clear statement of its position.79

C.

State as Adjudicator

With respect to first-order capacity constraints, the analysis of cases
involving the state as adjudicator does not differ materially from those
involving the state as regulator.
More difficult, however, is figuring out how to overcome the secondorder capacity constraints on judges’ abilities to balance incommensurables
such as competing countries’ interests in hearing a case. With respect to
75. See id., at 2877–83.
76. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864–1865 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa, 80b-14).
77. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
78. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
79. Sometimes the political branches express their tolerance for such suits in an express
statement in the litigation (the classic Bernstein exception scenario). In other cases, the political
branches may express their views through legislative action taken prior to an actual dispute (as in the
Second Hickenlooper Amendment or the Helms-Burton Act).
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the United States at least, statements of interest provide a vehicle by which
to gauge the domestic interest. With respect to foreign interests, countries
might express their interests through diplomatic notes, amicus briefs, or
even the enactment of legislation.
While these devices help, they are hardly fail-safes. For one thing, they
present an information-forcing problem — should a sovereign (whether
the United States or foreign) be required to articulate its interest in a case?
Experience with sovereign immunity law prior to the FSIA’s enactment
suggests that governments are not always keen of being put in that
position.80 For another thing, governments change, and consequently so
do their interests. The United States’ litigating position under the Alien
Tort Statute has changed dramatically between the Bush and Obama
Administrations: similarly, Ecuador’s views on the Lago Agrio litigation
changed remarkably over the course of the case.81 Changing
governments — and consequent shifts in their litigating positions —
complicate the interest balancing inquiry, especially when cases are
protracted as international cases often are. Finally, even if the two
foregoing problems can be overcome, courts still face the task of
balancing, particularly where the sovereigns’ interests collide (as they often
do, for example, in the discovery context).
Risks of retaliation are especially difficult to monitor. Sovereigns might
retaliate by imposing anti-antisuit injunctions or refusing to enforce U.S.
judgments. Such retaliation may only materialize after the U.S. court has
awarded relief (or refused to do so), requiring the court to engage in a
degree of prediction about how the foreign sovereign’s courts might act.
Often, sovereigns do not make their views known, and instead the court is
faced with a private party’s representation that a particular judicial act will
result in some retaliation by the foreign sovereign. Foreign sovereigns have
on occasion made their views known, whether through judicial filings or
communications with the State Department, but such airing of the
sovereign’s view tends not to occur in response to any formal mechanism.
Congress might fill an important gap here by amending the United States
Code explicitly to authorize courts to invite statements of interest from
foreign governments, just as they do from the United States.

CONCLUSION
The Lago Agrio litigation supplies a good example of a case highlighting
the collision between modern international civil litigation doctrines and the
sovereign equality principle. As new doctrines have emerged to mitigate
80. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 8, at 233–34.
81. See, e.g., Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 389 (2d Cir. 2011).
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the risks of conflict and jurisdictional competition, those doctrines have
forced courts to make an increasing array of normative determinations
about the weight of a foreign sovereign’s interests, the legitimacy of its
conduct, or the adequacy of its system. Though perhaps designed to shore
up the sovereign equality principle, these doctrines can end up harming it.
A functional approach reduces the risk of such harm. Such an approach
trains on the capacity (and limits) of a court to undertake the inquiries
demanded by these doctrines. Those capacities and limits differ radically
depending on whether the court is evaluating the foreign state as a party,
an adjudicator, or a regulator. Of special concern are cases where courts
are asked to make prospective assessments about the risk of retaliation by
a foreign sovereign and cases where courts are asked to weigh the strength
of a foreign sovereign’s interest. More formal mechanisms for soliciting
the views of foreign governments, akin to requests for statements of
interest by the United States, can lower, though not eliminate, those risks.

